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Abstract— The role of competition and monetary benefits in
the design of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) is largely an
unexplored area. In this paper, we investigate the effect of
competition among the competitive web based CDNs and show
that little difference in their performance may cause significant
financial gain/loss. It turns out that the economy of scale effect is
very significant for the success of a CDN in a competitive market.
So CDN peering might be a good idea. Since performance and
conforming to the service level agreement (SLA) with content
providers is very important, we then focus on designing CDN
from this perspective. We provide an asymptotically optimal
static request routing policy for a CDN under a model where
a CDN company guarantees a certain level of user latency to the
content providers in the SLA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Content distribution (or, delivery) networks (CDNs) provide
a means to improve the performance of web-based applications
where clients access information from an origin server [1]. A
CDN consists of a set of surrogate servers that are placed
at different “points” in the Internet. By directing requests to
surrogate servers that are located close (in terms of latency)
to clients, CDNs avoid congested paths (parts) of the network
and thus are able to significantly reduce the response time of
web-based applications.
In principle, each web-based content provider could setup its
own CDN to better serve its clients. However, for most content
providers it is financially and technically not feasible to main-
tain their own CDN. Therefore, in practice, content providers
contract a CDN company to provide this service [2] [3].
Typically, a CDN company and a content provider sign a ser-
vice level agreement (SLA) which determines the performance
(quality of service) and price of the service provided by the
CDN company to the content provider.
In this paper, we are interested in how economic aspects of
commercial CDN companies influence the design of network
protocols for CDNs (such as how client requests are optimally
routed to surrogate servers). Like any other business organi-
zation, the goal of a rational commercial CDN company is
maximizing its monetary benefit. There are two main factors
which affect the monetary benefit of a CDN company: the
performance and the price of the service. Naturally, when two
CDN companies charge the same price then a content provider
will contract the CDN which offers the better performance.
On the other hand, if two CDN companies offer the same
performance, content providers will choose the one with the
lower price. Therefore, in order to predict the monetary benefit,
or optimize the operation of a CDN company, one needs
to develop an economic model that relates the performance
and monetary benefit in the situation where several CDN
companies compete for market share. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no previous work on protocol design
for CDN to maximize the monetary benefit in a competitive
market.
For our analysis, we consider the situation where the
service level agreement (SLA) guarantees a certain level of
performance improvement β (given by the ratio of new and
old request response time for clients) for the content provider.
For the situation where a few CDN companies compete in a
large market (in terms of content providers), we show that the
CDN company which offers the best performance (in terms
of β) will dominate the market. For example, in the case of
two competitive CDNs, our model shows that if one CDN
has a very slight performance advantage over its rival CDN
(i.e., a better value of β) then in equilibrium its revenue is
at least four times higher than its rival. It is worth noting
that this result is in line with what is happening in practice.
Note that a CDN company can improve its performance by
(a) deploying a large number of surrogates server and (b)
deploying sophisticated algorithms for optimally routing client
requests to surrogate servers. The above result then implies
that large CDN companies (in terms of surrogate server) with
sophisticated algorithms have a huge competitive advantage
and will dominate the market. And indeed, currently the
CDN market is dominated by a (very) small number of large
CDN companies that closely guard their algorithms for client
requests routing in order to keep their competitive advantage.
Having established that performance (with respect to the
SLA) is of utmost importance, we next develop a request
routing (or, redirection) policy to maximize the number of
requests that are served within the agreed value of β in the
SLA. In particular, we propose a simple static request routing
policy and show that it is asymptotically optimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the relationship between the performance and the
revenue of web-based CDNs in a competitive market. Sec-
tion III describes the existing request routing policies and
presents a model for routing policies that is based on ser-
vice level agreement. A static request routing policy for this
model is proposed and it has been proven that this policy
is asymptotically optimal. Numerical results are given in the
corresponding sections. Section IV concludes the paper and
suggests future research directions.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND
REVENUE OF A CDN IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET
In the case of web-based competitive content delivery
networks, our goal is to understand how the performance of
a CDN affects its competitiveness. Doing an exact analysis
to get the equilibrium point requires solving a system of
linear equations where the number of equations increases
with the number of CDNs involved. As a result, although
numerical calculation of equilibrium revenues for particular
values of various parameters are relatively easy for arbitrary
number of competitive CDNs, theoretically proving the general
relationship among the equilibrium revenues is difficult for the
general case. So instead of modeling a general case involving
arbitrary number of CDNs, we use a simple model of two
CDNs to understand the relationship between the performance
and the revenue of a CDN in the competitive environment.
Later we extend the model and analyze the competition among
three CDNs. In both cases, it is found that in equilibrium
a CDN having better performance attracts substantially more
users at a higher price and thus generates significantly more
revenue than its competitors.
Most of the time, the financial fate of a CDN is deter-
mined by the service level agreement (SLA) signed between
CDN and the content provider. Service Level Agreements
are documents that specify exactly what services the service
provider will provide, how much the customer will pay, and
what will happen when things go wrong [4]. Since a typical
content provider is a small entity and lacks necessary expertise
and resources to negotiate the terms and conditions of a
SLA with a CDN, usually a CDN determines the terms and
conditions of its own SLA for all of its potential customers
and then publishes it. A content provider looks at the SLAs of
different CDNs and then chooses a CDN based on the services,
prices and penalties written on the SLA so that its utility is
maximized. The SLAs of different CDNs may vary but all of
them should have something in common, e.g., what would be
the guaranteed minimum improvement of user latency, what
would be the level of price charged by the CDN for the service
and how much penalty the CDN would have to pay to the
content provider when it is unable to achieve the guaranteed
performance. Usually, a CDN does not get extra money if its
level of performance is higher than the level guaranteed in the
SLA. Since most content providers themselves are unable to
monitor the performance, sometime independent third party
companies monitor the performance of the CDNs.
A. The Model
Our model has some similarity with the model of [5], which
they use to understand the competition for Internet service
classes. In our model, we use a performance parameter β to
quantify the performance of a CDN and a sensitivity parameter
θ to quantify the demand of a content provider.
1) Model of the CDNs: Quantifying the performance of a
CDN is very difficult. Traditionally, lower user latency and
higher availability have been the two most important services
provided by a CDN. Since most CDN usually guarantees
100% availability, availability should not be a big issue while
analyzing the competition. Recently, content delivery networks
are offering various other services such as web hosting.
However, for simplicity, in our model we use user latency
as the sole indicator of the performance of a CDN.
From the point of view of user latency, the performance of
a CDN can be measured by the improvement in user latency.
Let, ψ′ be the time required to serve a typical request from
an origin server and ψk be the time needed to serve the same
request when a CDN say, CDNk, serves it. In other word, ψ′
is the old user latency and ψk is the new user latency when
CDNk serves the request. Then the performance of CDNk
for that request can be defined as
βk =
ψk
ψ′
.
The minimum (best) possible value of the ψk is zero and the
maximum (worst) value of ψk should be equal to the value of
ψ′. The worst case scenario occurs when a request is served
by the origin server and then the value of βk is 1. No rational
content provider would hire any CDNk having βk ≥ 1. So
we assume the value of β lies between 0 and 1 for all CDN.
The smaller the value of β, the better the performance of the
corresponding CDN.
Each CDNk announces its performance parameter βk and a
price wk to the content providers. A content provider chooses
a CDN based on the values of βk and wk with an objective to
maximize its own utility. In this model, it is assumed that βk
of each CDNk is fixed but the CDN can change its price wk
to increase its competitiveness. The ultimate goal of a CDN
is assumed to maximize its revenue.
The revenue function of a CDN is defined as follows.
Let, there are K CDNs, say CDN1, CDN2, ..., CDNK ,
having performance parameters β1, β2, ..., βK ,
respectively. They compete among them by
changing their respective prices w1, w2, ..., wK to
maximize their revenues. Let, Λ1(w1, w2, ..., wK),
Λ2(w1, w2, ..., wK),...,ΛK(w1, w2, ..., wK) be the number of
customers (content providers) of CDN1, CDN2, ..., CDNK ,
respectively. The number of content providers of a CDN
depends on its price as well as the price of its competitors.
Definitely, Λs depend on the values of βs as well, but for
simplicity we keep that implicit, and note that the values of β
of each CDN is fixed during the whole competition process.
Since the revenue of a CDN can be obtained by multiplying
the number of customers with price, the revenue of CDNk
can be defined as
Jk(w1, w2, ..., wK) = Λ1(w1, w2, ..., wK)× wk.
Note that all CDNs would change their prices until they
reach a point where a unilateral change of price does not
increase the revenue of that CDN. Such a point is usually
refer to as a Nash Equilibrium. We actually want to find the
revenues at Nash Equilibrium. A Nash Equilibrium can be
formally defined as follows.
A Nash Equilibrium is a set of prices
(w∗1 , w
∗
2 , ..., w
∗
k, ..., w
∗
K), such that for any CDN, say
CDNk, for all values of wk,
Jk(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2 , ..., w
∗
k, .., w
∗
K) ≥ J1(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2 , ..., wk, .., w
∗
K).
In words: in a Nash Equilibrium, no CDN has a unilateral
incentive to change its strategy (i.e., price).
From now on, we would write simply Λk and Jk instead of
Λk(w1, w2, ..., wK) and Jk(w1, w2, ..., wK).
2) Model of the Content Providers: All content providers
are not equally sensitive to the service provided by a CDN.
The benefit due to lower user latency largely depends on the
type of the content and the end users of the content provider.
We use a sensitivity parameter θ to represent this sensitivity
of the content providers.
We can define θ as the maximum utility that can be
increased by any CDN for that particular content provider.
From the property of β, we know that the best possible value
of β is zero and the worst possible value is 1. So when βk = 1,
there is no gain in utility; and when βk = 0 the gain in utility
is maximum and it is θ−wk, where wk is the price charged by
CDNk. So, when a content provider with sensitivity parameter
θ hires CDNk, the pay off function can be defined as
U(θ, k) = θ × (1− βk)− wk.
In our model, all content providers are rational and they
select the CDN which has the maximum value for the pay
off function, i.e., a content provider with sensitivity θ selects
CDNj if and only if
U(θ, j) = max
∀k
U(θ, k).
3) Assumptions: Other important assumptions of our model
are stated below:
• The utility of a content provider increases linearly with
the decrease of β in the interval [0,1]. Although this
assumption might not be the case for some content
providers, it captures the relevant feature that utility
increases with the decrease of β while maintaining
tractability.
• No content provider hire more than one CDN. It is a
reasonable and practical assumption.
• Content providers differ in their preferences for lower
user latency. So different content providers have different
values for the sensitivity parameter θ. To reflect the range
of preferences in the population of content providers
in the simplest manner, it is assumed that there is a
continuum of content providers whose θ parameters form
a population distribution which is uniformly distributed
on the interval [0,1], and the number of content providers
Λ is a very big number. The uniform distribution is
commonly used in Economics for modeling competition
among firms whose products are of different qualities;
see [6], [7], [8] among many others. This assumption
tells that the total number of content providers having
sensitivity between θ1 and θ2 (where 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ 1)
is Λ(θ2−θ1). We make an additional assumption that the
number of requests served by each CDN is proportional to
the number of content providers it has. That means that in
order to compare the revenues of competitive CDNs, we
need to take into account only their price and the number
of content providers they have. Real life scenario where
content providers vary in their amount of content can be
simulated in this model by representing a content provider
with a number of content providers which is proportional
to its content size.
• CDNs have no capacity constraints. That is each CDN
can serve as many content providers as it can get. This
is actually not very unrealistic assumption. If a CDN can
not serve a request, it can always redirect it to the origin
servers. In that case, the performance parameter β of that
CDN has a worse value.
A strategy for a content provider is a choice of CDN to
join, given the prices quoted by the CDNs. Throughout this
paper, we would use a superscript ∗ to denote various terms
at equilibrium (e.g., at equilibrium the price, the number of
content providers and the revenue of CDN1 are w∗1 , Λ∗1, J∗1 ,
respectively).
B. Competition between two CDNs
In this scenario, two CDNs, say CDN1 and CDN2, having
performance parameter β1 and β2, charges price w1 and w2,
respectively. Let J1(w1, w2) and J2(w1, w2) be the revenue
of CDN1 and CDN2, respectively.
Now the question we want to answer is:
Given the performance parameters β1 and β2, what
is the relation between the equilibrium revenues of
CDN1 and CDN2 in a duopoly?
For the sake of analysis, without loss of generality we
assume β2 ≥ β1. In order to find the revenues of the two
CDNs at equilibrium at first we need to prove a few lemmas.
Lemma 1: If CDN2 is rational and β2 ≥ β1, then CDN2
would always set price such that w2 ≤ w1.
Proof: The proof is straightforward. If w2 > w1, then
for any content provider, pay off function for CDN1 has
higher value than that of the payoff function for CDN2. So no
rational content provider would choose CDN2 and its revenue
would be zero. Since the objective of CDN2 is to maximize its
revenue, it will never charge price higher than that of CDN1.
When the value β1 is equal to that of β2, analysis is much
easier; both CDNs essentially end up with charging same price
and each gets the same number of content providers. So we
focus on the case where β2 > β1. In this case, w2 must be
less than w1, otherwise no rational content provider would hire
CDN2.
A content provider’s selection of a particular CDN would
depend on its sensitivity parameter θ. Following lemma shows
best choices for different values of θ.
Lemma 2: There exist θ1 and θ2 such that for a content
provider with sensitivity parameter θ, if 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ2 then
0 ≥ U(θ, 2) and 0 ≥ U(θ, 1), i.e., choosing no CDN is the
best option; if θ2 ≤ θ ≤ θ1 then U(θ, 2) ≥ U(θ, 1) and
U(θ, 2) ≥ 0, i.e., choosing CDN2 is the best option; if θ1 ≤
θ ≤ 1 then U(θ, 1) ≥ U(θ, 2) and U(θ, 1) ≥ 0, i.e., choosing
CDN1 is the best option.
Proof: Fig. 1 describes the constraints of the CDNs in
choosing their prices. Since β1 and β2 are fixed, the slope
of the utility curve for each CDN is fixed. The CDNs can
only change the prices to change the y-intercept. A content
provider chooses the CDN which has the higher utility at its
sensitivity level. If the utilities of both CDNs are negative,
then the content provider does not choose any CDN. Fig. 1
shows two scenarios where at least one CDN has no revenue,
so the price charged by that CDN is not a feasible price at
all. Fig. 2 shows the feasible scenario where both CDNs have
nonzero revenues and this lemma follows from this figure.
The two CDNs would play a non-cooperative game to
maximize their own revenue. In Nash-Equilibrium, both CDNs
would settle in prices w1 = w∗1 and w2 = w∗2 such that any
unilateral change of price would not increase the revenue.
We consider that point as the equilibrium point. Following
theorem shows that in equilibrium, the revenue of CDN1 is
significantly higher than that of CDN2.
Theorem 1: In equilibrium total revenue of CDN1 is at
least four times of that of CDN2, i.e., we have,
J∗1 > 4J
∗
2 .
Proof:
The critical value of θ1 is the identity of marginal content
provider who is indifferent between CDN1 and CDN2, so
we have U(θ1, 1) = U(θ1, 2), which implies that θ1 × (1 −
β1)− w1 = θ1 × (1− β2)− w2, i.e.,
θ1 =
w1 − w2
β2 − β1
.
Again, the critical value of θ2 is the sensitivity of the marginal
user who is indifferent between hiring CDN2 and hiring no
CDN at all, so we have U(θ2, 1) = 0, which implies that
θ2 × (1− β2)− w2 = 0, i.e.,
θ2 =
w2
1− β2
.
The content providers having the value of their sensitivity
between θ1 and 1 will choose CDN1 (see Fig. 2), while the
content providers having the value of their sensitivity between
θ2 and θ1 will choose CDN2. So the masses of content
providers who join CDN1 and CDN2 are (1 − θ1) × Λ and
(θ1 − θ2) × Λ, respectively (given the assumption that the
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Fig. 2. Price setting where both CDNs have some revenue.
preferences are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and
Λ is the total number of content providers).
Now, total revenue of CDN1 is J1 = (1 − θ1) × Λ × w1,
i.e.,
J1 =
(
1−
w1 − w2
β2 − β1
)
× Λ× w1.
Similarly, total revenue of CDN2 is J2 = (θ1 − θ2)×Λ×w2,
i.e.,
J2 =
(
w1 − w2
β2 − β1
−
w2
1− β2
)
× Λ× w2.
To get the point where revenue is maximum, set first derivative
to zero (provided the second derivative is negative).
Now,
dJ1
dw1
= 0
=⇒
(
1−
w1 − w2
β2 − β1
)
× Λ −
w1 × Λ
β2 − β1
= 0
=⇒ w1 =
β2 − β1 + w2
2
(1)
Now for CDN2,
dJ2
dw2
= 0
=⇒
(
w1 − w2
β2 − β1
−
w2
1− β2
)
× Λ
+
(
−1
β2 − β1
−
1
1− β2
)
× Λ× w2 = 0
=⇒ w2 =
w1 × (1− β2)
2(1− β1)
(2)
Since the second derivatives are negative in both cases, the
values we get are local maximum. So for a fix value of w2,
(1) gives the optimal value of w1 for CDN1; for a fix value
of w1, (2) gives the optimal value of w2 for CDN2. Now, if
we solve (1) and (2), we get the equilibrium values w∗1 and
w∗2 which are:
w∗1 =
2(1− β1)(β2 − β1)
4(1− β1)− (1 − β2)
,
w∗2 =
(1− β2)(β2 − β1)
4(1− β1)− (1 − β2)
.
The pair of prices (w∗1 , w∗2) gives the Nash Equilibrium,
because if either of the CDN changes its price, then its revenue
will go down.
Now, since β2 > β1, i.e., (1− β2) < (1− β1), we have,
w∗1 >
2(1− β2)(β2 − β1)
4(1− β1)− (1− β2)
=⇒ w∗1 > 2w
∗
2 (3)
Now, total number of content providers of CDN1 is
Λ∗1 = (1− θ
∗
1)Λ =
(
1−
w∗1 − w
∗
2
β2 − β1
)
Λ
=
(
2(1− β1)
4(1− β1)− (1− β2)
)
Λ
and the total number of content providers of CDN2 is
Λ∗2 = (θ
∗
1 − θ
∗
2)Λ =
(
w∗1 − w
∗
2
β2 − β1
−
w∗2
1− β2
)
Λ
=
(
(1 − β1)
4(1− β1)− (1− β2)
)
Λ
So we have,
Λ∗1 = 2× Λ
∗
2 (4)
Now, equilibrium revenue of CDN1 is J∗1 = w∗1Λ∗1. Using (3)
and (4), we have J∗1 > 4w∗2Λ∗1. So,
J∗1 > 4J
∗
2 .
Note that, Theorem 1 gives a conservative estimate which
is always true when β1 > β2. The ratio of revenues increases
significantly when the difference between β1 and β2 increases.
C. Competition among Three CDNs
Let, three competitive CDNs, say, CDN1, CDN2, CDN3,
have performance paratmeter β1, β2, β3; number of users Λ1,
Λ2, Λ3, and charge price w1, w2, w3, respectively.
Theorem 2: If β1 < β2 < β3, then in equilibrium, Λ∗1 >
Λ∗2 > 2Λ
∗
3 and w∗1 > 1.5w∗2 > 3w∗3 . So in equilibrium, the
revenue of CDN2 is at least four times of that of CDN3 and
the revenue of CDN1 is at least six times of that of CDN3
i.e., J∗1 > 1.5J∗2 > 6J∗3 .
Proof: Similar techniques of the proof of Theorem 1 can
be used to proof this theorem. Here we provide a brief proof
sketch by mentioning values for key terms. For complete proof
of this theorem, see [9].
Equilibrium prices:
w∗1 =
[
4(1− β2)(β2 − β1)(β3 − β1)−
(1 − β3)(β2 − β1)(β2 − β1)
]/
[
8(1− β2)(β3 − β1)− 2(1− β3)(β2 − β1)−
2(1− β2)(β3 − β2)
]
,
w∗2 =
[
(1− β2)(β2 − β1)(β3 − β2)
]/
[
4(1− β2)(β3 − β1)− (1 − β3)(β2 − β1)−
(1− β2)(β3 − β2)
]
and
w∗3 =
[
(1 − β3)(β2 − β1)(β3 − β2)
]/
[
8(1− β2)(β3 − β1)− 2(1− β3)(β2 − β1)−
2(1− β2)(β3 − β2)
]
.
Since β3 > β2, i.e., (1 − β3) < (1− β2), we have,
w∗2 > 2w
∗
3 (5)
and (1−β2)(β2−β1)(β3−β1) > (1−β3)(β2−β1)(β2−β1),
so we have,
w∗1 >
3
2
w∗2 (6)
Number of content providers in equilibrium:
Λ∗1 =
[
2(1− β2)(β3 − β1)Λ−
1
2
(1− β3)(β2 − β1)Λ
]/
[
4(1− β2)(β3 − β1)− (1− β3)(β2 − β1)−
(1− β2)(β3 − β2)
]
,
Λ∗2 =
[
(1− β2)(β3 − β1)Λ +
1
2
(1− β3)(β2 − β1)Λ
]/
[
4(1− β2)(β3 − β1)− (1 − β3)(β2 − β1)−
(1− β2)(β3 − β2)
]
and
Λ∗3 =
[1
2
(β2 − β1)(β3 − β2)Λ
]/[
4(1− β2)(β3 − β1)−
(1− β3)(β2 − β1)− (1− β2)(β3 − β2)
]
.
Now, since 1− β2 > 1− β3 and β3 − β1 > β2 − β1, we have
(1− β2)(β3 − β1) > (1− β3)(β2 − β1), so,
Λ∗1 > Λ
∗
2 (7)
Again, since β3 − β2 ≤ 1 − β2 and β2 − β1 < β3 − β1, we
have, (β2 − β1)(β3 − β2) < (1− β2)(β3 − β1), so,
2Λ∗3 < Λ
∗
2 (8)
From (7) and (8), we have Λ∗1 > Λ∗2 > 2Λ∗3 and from
(5) and (6), we have w∗1 > 1.5w∗2 > 3w∗3 in equilibrium.
Since, J∗1 = Λ∗1w∗1 , J∗2 = Λ∗2w∗2 and J∗3 = Λ∗3w∗3 , clearly,
J∗1 > 1.5J
∗
2 > 6J
∗
3 .
Although Theorem 2 gives a modest lower bound, numerical
results of next section show that in most cases the performance
advantage generates far higher revenue than this lower bound.
D. Numerical Results
Here we present some numerical results from MATLAB
simulation for various values of βs. First we show results for
our first model of two CDNs and then we present results for
three CDNs.
TABLE I
RATIO OF EQUILIBRIUM REVENUES OF TWO COMPETITIVE CDNS FOR
DIFFERENT VALUES OF β .
β1 β2
J
∗
1
J∗2
0.01 0.02 4.040816
0.11 0.12 4.045455
0.21 0.22 4.051282
0.31 0.32 4.058824
0.41 0.42 4.068966
0.51 0.52 4.083333
0.61 0.62 4.105263
0.71 0.72 4.142857
0.81 0.82 4.222222
0.91 0.92 4.500000
Results of Table I shows that when the difference of β1
and β2 is very small, equilibrium revenue of CDN1 is almost
always slightly higher than four times of equilibrium revenue
of CDN2. Next, we keep β2 fixed at 0.50 and check the ratio
of equilibrium revenues for different values of β1 (see Fig. 3).
It is clear that the more the difference between the values of
β1 and β2, the higher the ratio of equilibrium revenues.
TABLE II
RATIOS OF EQUILIBRIUM REVENUES OF THREE COMPETITIVE CDNS FOR
DIFFERENT VALUES OF β .
β1 β2 β3
J
∗
1
J∗2
J
∗
2
J∗3
J
∗
1
J∗3
0.01 0.02 0.03 4.924346 988.082474 4865.659794
0.11 0.12 0.13 4.927120 888.091954 4375.735632
0.21 0.22 0.23 4.930608 788.103896 3885.831169
0.31 0.32 0.33 4.935125 688.119403 3395.955224
0.41 0.42 0.43 4.941206 588.140351 2906.122807
0.51 0.52 0.53 4.949834 488.170213 2416.361702
0.61 0.62 0.63 4.963033 388.216216 1926.729730
0.71 0.72 0.73 4.985740 288.296296 1437.370370
0.81 0.82 0.83 5.034020 188.470588 948.764706
0.91 0.92 0.93 5.206731 89.142857 464.142857
Although theoretically the lower bound we achieve for three
competitive CDNs are relatively modest compare to the lower
bound of two CDNs, Table II shows that in the case of three
competitive CDNs, the ratio of equilibrium revenues for the
top two CDNs are almost same as that for two competitive
CDNs. This result indicates that with the increase of number
of competitors the advantage of the CDN having best perfor-
mance remains very significant. Another important result is
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Fig. 3. Ratio of equilibrium revenues of CDN1 and CDN2 for different
values of β1 when β2 is fixed at 0.75.
that in equilibrium the CDN having worst performance gets
much smaller revenue compare to other CDNs even with very
small difference in their values of β.
E. Discussions
In the model analyzed, it is found that the performance
of a CDN is very critical in a competitive market, i.e., a
little performance advantage over the competitor may result in
significant increase of revenue. This results underscore the fact
that during SLA (service level agreement), each CDN would
like to announce the best performance it could achieve in order
to grab larger share of the market. However, if it can not
achieve that performance in real life, it has to pay huge penalty.
This two facts imply the importance of designing a CDN with
a view to achieve that performance level as much as possible.
Next section describes how this idea can be incorporated in
the request routing policy employed by a web-based CDN.
III. ROUTING POLICIES BASED ON SERVICE LEVEL
AGREEMENTS
Here, we concentrate on the design of a CDN from the
perspective of maximizing revenue. We assume that in a
typical SLA the CDN guarantees a minimum absolute (i.e.,
a fixed user latency), or relative latency (i.e., a fixed β) and
charges a price for it. If the CDN can not achieve the specified
β for any request then it has to pay some penalty for that.
The penalty is proportionate to the number of requests that
can not be served within β. It is assumed that there is no
monetary incentive for the CDN to achieve β better than
what is specified in the SLA. So maximizing revenue of a
CDN actually depends on how many requests it can serve
within a specified level of β. The β of a CDN is relevant to
many design issues, such as surrogate server allocation and
placement, request routing etc.
For an existing CDN, little can be done about surrogate
server allocation and placement because the infrastructure can
hardly be changed overnight. On the other hand, in the long
term the existing infrastructure of other CDNs changes as well
as new competitors enter the market. It requires much more
market oriented information to understand how the CDN react
to competition in the long term. So we rather concentrate
on a model to determine request routing policy when the
infrastructure (e.g., allocation and placement of surrogate
servers) of a CDN is fixed.
A. Background
The request routing problem is to decide the appropriate
surrogate server for a particular client request in terms of
certain metrics, e.g., surrogate server load (where surrogate
server with the lowest load is chosen), end-to-end latency
(where surrogate server that offers the shortest response time
to the client is chosen), or distance (where surrogate server
closest to the client is chosen). Here, we look at the problem
from a different perspective. We assume that β is already set
by the service level agreement (SLA) and what we need is to
find a request routing policy to select a surrogate server so that
the number of requests that can be served within the required
value of β is maximized.
The entire request routing problem can be split into two
parts: devising a redirection policy and selecting a redirection
mechanism. A redirection policy defines how to select a
surrogate server in response to a given client request. It is
basically an algorithm invoked when the client request is made.
A redirection mechanism, in turn, is a mean of informing the
client about this selection. Here, our focus is on the redirection
policy.
A redirection policy can be either adaptive or non-adaptive.
The former considers current system conditions while se-
lecting a surrogate, whereas the latter does not. Adaptive
redirection policies usually take higher selection time, but they
have lower transmission and processing time due to better
selection. Several adaptive (see [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
[11] [15]) and nonadaptive policies (see [16] [17] [15]) have
been explored in the literature.
A complex adaptive policy is used in Akamai [18]. It con-
siders a few additional metrics, like surrogate server load, the
reliability of routes between client and each of the surrogate
servers, and bandwidth that is currently available to a surrogate
server. Unfortunately, the actual policy is subject to trade secret
and cannot be found in the published literature.
B. Redirection Policy based on β
In this section, we investigate about the redirection policy
to maximize the monetary benefit of the CDN. We use a
simplified model for the operation of a CDN and then analyze
it to determine appropriate redirection policy for that model.
First, we use Dynamic Programming (DP) to find the optimal
policy. However, any dynamic policy has large overhead in
terms of online computation time. On the other hand, a static
policy does not require any online computation, easier to
implement and the overhead is low, if not zero. For our model,
we propose a static request redirection policy and prove that
it is asymptotically optimal, i.e., optimal for a system having
very large arrival rate and service rate. Note that in the past
static policy has been found asymptotically optimal in different
contexts (e.g., congestion dependent network pricing [19]).
1) The Model: Here we introduce a model for the opera-
tion of a CDN. For simplicity, we assume that all requests
are identical (i.e., take same resources such as bandwidth,
processor time etc., and the price and the penalty for every
request are also same). We also assume that the origin server
is far away and so, the time to serve any request from the
origin server is assumed to be same (i.e., old user latency is
same for all end users). Then the required new user latency ψ
(=β×old user latency) is same for all end users. Alternatively,
this assumption is not required where the CDN guarantees a
fixed user latency (i.e., ψ) for the end users in the service level
agreement with the content providers. For any request, if the
CDN cannot serve it within ψ, then it has to pay a penalty.
Let, there are total m surrogate servers and the total area
of the network is A (see Fig. 4). The end users are uniformly
distributed over the whole network and the exponential request
arrival rate in total network A is λ. So arrival rate per unit
area is λA . Let, µ1, µ2, ...µm be the exponential service rates of
surrogate servers 1, 2, ...,m, respectively (this service includes
facing from the origin server, if needed). Let w1 be the price
charged by a CDN for serving a request within ψ and w1′ be
the penalty for not serving it within the stipulated time. It is
also assumed that the servers have unlimited queuing capacity.
Let, ni(t) be the number of requests pending in sur-
rogate server Si at time t. We will be writing N(t) =
(n1(t), · · · , nm(t)). We assume that the requests are processed
in first-come-first-serve basis. Then on average the processing
time for a request arriving at time t in surrogate server Si is
qi(t) =
ni(t)+1
µi
.
It is assumed that the time required for the end users to send
a request to a surrogate server is negligible and hence ignored.
Now, a request that arrives at time t can be served by surrogate
server Si within a required value of β if the transmission time
from the end user and the surrogate server is less than or equal
to ri(t) = ψ − qi(t). It is assumed that the transmission time
is proportional to the distance and does not vary over time
(i.e., we ignore any time varying network congestion). So any
request originating at time t within the radius ri(t) of server
Si can be served by that server within the required value of
β (i.e., ψ). Say, this area, characterized by the radius ri(t), is
Ai(t). Now if this area of two or more servers intersect at any
time, then the requests which arrive from the common area can
be served by any of these servers. If a request can be served by
more than one surrogate servers within the required value of
β (i.e. ψ), then the policy to determine the appropriate server
with an objective to maximize the revenue can be described
as the routing policy we are looking for. If no server can serve
the request within ψ, then it is served by the origin server. So,
we also ignore the availability issue of the CDN in our model.
2) Analysis: At first, we focus on some important features
of the model that give some idea about the potential solutions.
Lemma 3: Under any policy the number of pending re-
quests at any server Si is bounded by ⌈ψµi − 1⌉.
Proof: Recall that the radius of any server Si is defined
as ri(t) = ψ−
ni(t)+1
µi
, where ni(t) is the number of requests
at server Si at time t. So when the number of requests at server
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Fig. 4. An illustration of the term ’common area’ and ’exclusive area’ for
a CDN having three surrogate servers. Dotted line represents the total area
A of the network. End users are uniformly distributed over this area A. At
any time t, φ1(t) is the common area between server S1 and S2. Requests
originated from this area can be served within the required value of β (i.e.
ψ) by any of these two servers. Similarly, φ2(t) is the common area between
server S1 and S3, φ3(t) is the common area between server S2 and S3,
φ4(t) is the common area among servers S1, S2 and S3. At any time t,
requests originating from area Φ1(t) can only be served by server S1 and so
Φ1(t) is the exclusive area of server S1. Similarly, Φ2(t) and Φ3(t) are the
exclusive areas of servers S2 and S3, respectively.
Si is ⌈ψµi − 1⌉, the radius ri ≤ 0. That means that when at
any server Si, the number of pending requests is ⌈ψµi − 1⌉,
no more requests can be served within the required value of ψ
and so the arrival rate is zero. When the arrival rate is zero, the
queue can not grow any more and so, the maximum number
of pending requests in any surrogate server Si is bounded by
⌈ψµi − 1⌉.
One important question for any routing policy is if any given
request that can be served within ψ should be served or not.
It may be the case that not serving the request may give the
opportunity to serve more requests in the future. Following
lemma shows that that is not the case.
Lemma 4: If a request can be served by at least one sur-
rogate server within the required value of ψ, then on average
serving the request returns more or at least equal revenue than
not serving it.
Proof: Suppose, there are two identical systems S and
S ′ such that the number of surrogate servers, their locations,
service rates and the request arrivals everything is identical in
both systems. Assume that system S ′ use an optimal request
routing policy and it denies service to a certain request, say
i-th request, even when it can be served by a server, say server
Si. Now if we can show that another policy in system S that
admits the i-th request to surrogate server Si and on average
it can make at least as much revenue as system S ′, then we
are done.
Suppose that i-th request is admitted to the server Si
of system S. Assume system S and S ′ takes exactly same
decision for all requests except i-th request. Now assume j-
th request (j > i) is the first request after i-th request where
system S can not serve the request within the required value of
ψ but system S ′ can. So, system S can not admit that request
and lose revenue. Now, when j-th request arrives, in the worst
case, server Si in system S has one more request to serve than
the corresponding server in system S ′ and all other servers in
both system are in identical state. So, in system S ′, server Si is
the only server that can serve j-th request within the required
value of ψ. Now, when system S ′ accepts the j-th request,
the revenue of both systems are same. Since all requests are
identical and both i-th and j-th requests are served by server
Si in system S and S ′, respectively, on average i-th request
will depart earlier in system S than j-th request in system S ′.
So after that there would not be any request that can be served
by system S ′, but not by system S, and on average the revenue
of system S ′ is not greater than system S. Note that, since on
average i-th requests departs earlier than the arrival of j-th
request, on average total revenue of system S will actually be
higher than system S ′.
Following theorem defines a criteria to maximize the rev-
enue.
Theorem 3: The revenue is maximized if and only if the
throughput of the system is maximized. The throughput of the
system is maximized if
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
(A1(t) ∪A2(t) ∪ ... ∪ Am(t)) dt
]
is maximized and all requests that can be served within β (i.e.,
ψ) are actually served by a surrogate server.
Proof: Since all requests have identical price and penalty,
obviously maximizing throughput maximizes revenue and vice
versa.
Now, at any time t the number of requests that can
be served within ψ is λ (A1(t)∪A2(t)∪...∪Am(t))
A
and the
number of requests that can not be served within ψ is(
1− λ (A1(t)∪A2(t)∪...∪Am(t))
A
)
. Since from Lemma 4, we
know that not serving any request that can be served within
ψ does not increase overall revenue, serving all the requests
originating from the area (A1(t) ∪ A2(t) ∪ ... ∪ Am(t)) will
maximize the throughput and revenue. So net revenue from
the requests originating at time t is
λ
(A1(t) ∪ A2(t) ∪ ... ∪ Am(t))
A
w1−(
1− λ (A1(t)∪A2(t)∪...∪Am(t))
A
)
w1
′
= λ (A1(t)∪A2(t)∪...∪Am(t))
A
(w1 + w1
′)− w1
′.
So, the expected long term average revenue is given by
limT→∞
λ
T
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
(A1(t)∪A2(t)∪...∪Am(t))
A
(w1 + w1
′)−
w1
′
)
dt
]
.
Since λ,A,w1, w1′ all are constants, above entity will be
maximized if and only if the following entity is maximized
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
(A1(t) ∪ A2(t) ∪ ... ∪ Am(t)) dt
]
(9)
(The above limit exists for any routing policy, because the
state N = 0, corresponding to an empty system, is recurrent.)
Since maximizing throughput maximizes revenue, from now
on, we would try to find the policy that maximizes throughput
and would not use the terms w1 and w1′ anymore.
3) Optimal Dynamic Policy using Dynamic Programming:
Here we show how to obtain an optimal routing policy using
dynamic programming (DP). Since the number of choices for
each request is limited by the number of surrogate servers that
can serve the request within β (i.e. ψ), the set Π of all possible
policies (π) is compact. Again, in this finite state dynamic
programming problem, all states communicate, i.e., for each
pair of state (N,N′), there exists a policy under which we
can eventually reach N′ starting from N. So the state space is
irreducible. The Markov chain is also aperiodic. The expected
holding time at any state is bounded by the service rate and
the arrival rate at that state. The reward rate is bounded by
the number of servers that are non-empty at that state. Under
these assumptions, the standard dynamic programming theory
applies and asserts that there exists a policy which is optimal.
The process N(t) is a continuous-time Markov chain. Since
the total transition out of any state is bounded by ν = λ +∑m
i=1 µi, this Markov chain can be uniformized, leading to a
Bellman equation of the form
J∗ + h(N) = max
π∈Π
[ m∑
i=1
I(ni(N))+
m∑
i=1
λπi (N)
ν
h(N+ ei) +
m∑
i=1
µiI(ni(N))
ν
h(N− ei)
+
(
1−
m∑
i=1
λπi (N)
ν
−
m∑
i=1
µiI(ni(N))
ν
)
h(N)
]
(10)
Here, λπi (N) is the request arrival rate at server Si at system
state N under policy π, and to indicate the non-emptiness of
a server we use I(ni(N)), where ni(N) denotes the number
of requests at server Si when the system is at state N. We
define I(ni(N)) as follows:
I(ni(N)) =
{
1 if ni(N) > 0
0 otherwise.
We impose the condition h(0) = 0, in which case Bellman’s
equation has a unique solution [in the unknowns J∗ and h(·)].
Once Bellman’s equation is solved, an optimal policy is readily
obtained by choosing the policy at each state N that maximizes
the right-hand side in (10). The solution to Bellman’s equation
has the following interpretation: the scalar J∗ is the optimal
expected reward per unit time, and h(N) is the relative reward
in state N. In particular, consider an optimal policy that attains
the maximum in (10) for every state N. If we follow this
policy starting from N′ or state N, the expectation of the
difference in total rewards (over the infinite horizon) is equal
to (h(N′)− h(N))/ν.
The solution to Bellman’s equation and resulting optimal
policy can be computed using classical DP algorithms. How-
ever, the computational complexity increases with the size of
state space, which is exponential in the number of surrogate
servers m. For this reason, exact solution using DP is only
feasible only when the number of surrogate servers is quite
small.
C. Static Redirection Policy
Here we focus on finding a static policy that is asymptot-
ically optimal and at the same time the overhead is low (no
runtime computation to select the server).
Definition: We say that a routing policy is static if a particular
surrogate server is always responsible to serve requests orig-
inating from a particular end user independent of the state of
the system.
The key idea of the proposed policy is distributing the
common area among the participating servers in such a way
that the total throughput is maximized as well as the load is
balanced among the surrogate servers as much as possible. We
calculate the proportions of each common area to be assigned
to a participating server when the system is at empty state.
1) Optimization Problem and Proposed static policy, πs:
Suppose, when the system is at empty state the total number
of common areas is Z , at empty state total arrival rate at
common area z is φz = φz(0), at empty state total arrival
rate at exclusive area (i.e., not common with other servers) of
server Si is Φi = Φi(0) (see Fig. 4). Say, our policy assigns
Piz portion of common area z to server Si. Let, the number
of participating servers of common area z is za and they are
denoted as iz1 ...iza . Similarly, server Si participates in total
ib common areas denoted as zi1 ..zib . Now, at empty state the
total arrival rate for server Si is λi(0) = Φi +
∑zib
z=zi1
Pizφz .
Then the optimization problem is
max
m∑
i=1
Ii

Φi +
zib∑
z=zi1
Pizφz


subject to
0 ≤ Ii ≤ 1 ∀i,
0 ≤ Ii
(
Φi +
∑zib
z=zi1
Pizφz
)
≤ µi ∀i,
0 ≤ Piz ≤ 1 ∀i ∀z ,
0 ≤
∑izb
i=iz1
Piz ≤ 1 ∀z (11)
Note that, in the optimal solution of the above problem, if
λi > µi, then the value of Ii will be set in such a way that
Iiλi = µi, else if λi ≤ µi, the value of Ii will be 1. Once
we have solve above problem and have the values of Piz’s
then we divide common area z among the servers such that
each server Si gets Piz portion of the common area. So server
Si will serve Piz portions of the requests that originates from
common area z. Say, this proposed policy is πs.
The optimization problem ensures that
m∑
i=1
min(λi(0), µi) = max
∀π∈Π
m∑
i=1
min(λπi (0), µi)
where λi(0) is the request arrival rate at server Si under our
policy πs when the system is at empty state; Π is the set of
all possible policies of distributing the common areas among
the servers and λπi (0) is the request arrival rate at server Si
under policy π when the system is at empty state. We use this
information to prove that policy πs is asymptotically optimal.
Finally, in the asymptotic analysis of next section, it is
shown that any solution of the optimization problem (11) is
sufficient to be optimal for a system where the arrival and
service rate is close to infinity. However, in most cases, the
optimization problem (11) has multiple solutions. Now the
optimization problem (12) can be used to pick the best solution
among those solutions so that the system performs well even
with small arrival and service rate.
If γ denotes the optimal value of∑m
i=1 Ii
(
Φi +
∑zib
z=zi1
Pizφz
)
, then the optimization
problem is
min
Z∑
z=1
σ(λzi/µzi)
subject to ∑m
i=1 Ii
(
Φi +
∑zib
z=zi1
Pizφz
)
= γ,
0 ≤ Ii ≤ 1 ∀i,
0 ≤ Ii
(
Φi +
∑zib
z=zi1
Pizφz
)
≤ µi ∀i,
0 ≤ Piz ≤ 1 ∀i ∀z ,
0 ≤
∑izb
i=iz1
Piz ≤ 1 ∀z (12)
This way of solving multiobjective problems sequentially
is known as the lexicographical method [20] [21]. Note that,
σ(λzi/µzi) represents the variance of load (i.e., arrival rate/
service rate) of the participating servers of common area z.
2) Asymptotic Analysis: Since under our proposed static
policy πs the arrival rate in each surrogate server does not
depend on the states of other servers, the analysis can be
carried out for each individual server independently. At first,
we analyze the case of a single server CDN and then extend
it for a multiple server CDN to show that our proposed policy
is asymptotically optimal i.e., ratio of the throughput of the
proposed policy and the upper bound of the throughput under
any policy converges to 1 when the arrival rate and the service
rate of the system goes to infinity.
Throughput for a Single Server CDN
Consider a CDN consisting of one server which has expo-
nential service rate µ and the exponential arrival rate at state n
is λ(n) = λAπ
(
ψ − n+1
µ
)2
, where λA is the state independent
arrival rate per unit area and
(
ψ − n+1
µ
)
denotes the radius
of the circular area covered by the server when there are n
requests in the server. So this system can be viewed as a special
M/M/1 queue where exponential arrival rate varies with the
change of system state. State diagram for the system is shown
in Fig. 5.
We are interested in finding the throughput of such a CDN.
Following lemma gives the exact value of the throughput.
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µ
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λ(1) λ(ψµ−2)λ(n)λ(n−2)
Fig. 5. State diagram for a single server CDN.
Lemma 5: The throughput of the single server CDN is
J1 = µ
(
1−
1
1 +
∑⌈ψµ−1⌉
n=1
∏n−1
l=0
λ(l)
µ
)
Proof: Let pn be the probability that the system is at
state n. Since the total number of states is finite (i.e. nmax =
⌈ψµ−1⌉), the system is stable. So over a long period of time,
the number of transitions from any state n to state n+1 equals
the number of transitions from state n+1 to state n. Thus we
obtain the balance equations
pnλ(n) = pn+1µ for each (⌈ψµ− 1⌉) > n ≥ 0.
So, we have,
p1 =
λ(0)
µ
p0,
p2 =
λ(1)
µ
p1 = p0
λ(1)
µ
λ(0)
µ
,
and in general,
pn =
λ(1)
µ
pn−1 = p0
n−1∏
l=0
λ(l)
µ
.
Since summation of the probabilities of all states is 1, we
have
⌈ψµ−1⌉∑
n=0
pn = 1.
Putting the values of pn, we have
p0 +
⌈ψµ−1⌉∑
n=1
p0
n−1∏
l=0
λ(l)
µ
= 1.
Solving for p0, we get
p0 =
1
1 +
∑⌈ψµ−1⌉
n=1
∏n−1
l=0
λ(l)
µ
.
So the throughput is
µ(1− p0) = µ
(
1−
1
1 +
∑⌈ψµ−1⌉
n=1
∏n−1
l=0
λ(l)
µ
)
.
Now we use this result to do asymptotic analysis of the
throughput of a single server CDN.
Asymptotic Analysis for a Single Server CDN
For asymptotic analysis, we scale the system through a
proportional increase in arrival rate and service rate. More
specifically, let c ≥ 1 be a scaling factor. The scaled system
has arrival rate λc = cλ and the service rate µc = cµ. Note that
other parameters, total network area A and maximum allowed
user latency ψ are held fixed. We will use a superscript c to
denote various quantities of interest for the scaled system.
At first, we would like to find an upper bound for the
throughput for the single server.
Lemma 6: The upper bound for the throughput of a single
server CDN is
Jcub = min(λ
c(0), µc),
where λc(n) denote the arrival rate when number of requests
at the server is n and µc is the service rate.
Proof: Since for all n, λc(0) ≥ λc(n), maximum
arrival rate is λc(0). Again, the server can never serve at a
rate faster than µc. So clearly the throughput is bounded by
min(λc(0), µc).
Following lemma shows that the actual throughput of a
very large system converges to this upper bound. It is easily
seen that the upper bound Jcub and actual throughput Jc1
will increase roughly linearly with c, and for this reason, a
meaningful comparison should first divide such quantities by
c, as in the result that follows.
Lemma 7: For the single server CDN,
lim
c→∞
1
c
Jc1 = lim
c→∞
1
c
Jcub,
where Jc1 is the actual throughput of the scaled system and
Jcub = min(λ
c(0), µc).
Proof: Fix some ǫ > 0 and let us consider a system with
arrival rate λcǫ(0) = λc(0) + ǫ and other parameters µc,A, ψ
are kept same. Let Jc1ǫ be the resulting actual throughput.
Clearly, for every n, λcǫ(n) ≥ λc(n). Now the probability
of the empty state for this system is
pc0ǫ =
1
1 +
∑cµψ−1
n=1
∏n−1
l=0
λcǫ(l)
µc
(13)
Since
λc(n)
µc
λc(0)
µc
=
λc(n)
λc(0)
=
(ψ − n+1
cµ
)2
(ψ − 1
cµ
)2
=
(
1−
n
cµψ − 1
)2
,
we have,
λcǫ(n)
µc
≥
λc(n)
µc
=
(
1−
n
cµψ − 1
)2
λc(0)
µc
So, for any finite constant C, limc→∞ λ
c
ǫ(C)
µc
≥ limc→∞
λc(0)
µc
and then from (13), we have,
pc0ǫ ≤
1
1 +
∑C
n=1
(
λc(0)
µc
)n
+
∑cµψ−1
n=C+1
∏n−1
l=0
λcǫ(l)
µc
≤
1
1 +
∑C
n=1
(
λc(0)
µc
)n (14)
Now, the arrival rate at empty state of the scaled system
can be greater than, equal to or less than the service rate. We
prove the lemma separately for those cases.
Case 1: λc(0) < µc
From (14) we have,
lim
c→∞
pc0ǫ ≤
1
1 +
λc(0)
µc
(
1−(λ
c(0)
µc )
C
)
1−λ
c(0)
µc
=
1− λ
c(0)
µc
1−
(
λc(0)
µc
)C+1 .
When c→∞, we are free to choose an arbitrarily large value
for C, then the value of
(
1−λ
c(0)
µc
1−(λ
c(0)
µc )
C+1
)
will converges to(
1− λ
c(0)
µc
)
and then we have,
lim
c→∞
pc0ǫ ≤
(
1−
λc(0)
µc
)
.
So
lim
c→∞
1
c
Jc1ǫ = lim
c→∞
1
c
µc(1 − pc0ǫ) ≥ lim
c→∞
1
c
λc(0) (15)
Again, since for all n, λ
c
ǫ(0)
µc
≥
λcǫ(n)
µc
, we have
limc→∞ p
c
0ǫ ≥
1
1+
∑
∞
n=1
(
λcǫ(0)
µc
)n , which implies,
lim
c→∞
pc0 ≥
(
1−
λcǫ(0)
µc
)
.
So
lim
c→∞
1
c
Jc1ǫ = lim
c→∞
1
c
µc(1 − pc0ǫ) ≤ lim
c→∞
1
c
λcǫ(0) (16)
This is true for any positive ǫ. We now let ǫ go to zero
in which case limc→∞ 1cλ
c
ǫ(0) tends to limc→∞ 1cλ
c(0), and
from (15) and (16), we have
lim
c→∞
1
c
Jc1 = lim
c→∞
1
c
λc(0) = lim
c→∞
1
c
Jcub.
Case 2: λc(0) ≥ µc
When λ
c(0)
µc
≥ 1 and the value for C is arbitrarily large,(
1
1+
∑
C
n=1(
λc(0)
µc )
n
)
converges to zero. Since when c → ∞,
we are free to choose an arbitrarily large value for C and
probability can not be negative, from (14) we have,
lim
c→∞
pc0ǫ = 0.
This is true for any positive ǫ. We now let ǫ go to zero in
which case limc→∞ 1cp
c
0ǫ tends to limc→∞ 1cp
c
0, and we have,
lim
c→∞
1
c
Jc1 = lim
c→∞
1
c
µc = lim
c→∞
1
c
Jcub.
Although it seems that c → ∞ is not practically feasible,
a very good approximation is achieved for fairly small values
of c (see Table III, IV, V).
Asymptotic Analysis for Multiple Server CDN under Static
Policy, πs
For the multiple server case we scale the system in the same
way like the asymptotic analysis for single server CDN. Let,
J cs be the actual throughput of our static policy πs in the
scaled system and J cub be the upper bound of the throughput
under any policy.
To assess the degree of suboptimality of our policy, we
develop an upper bound of throughput for the multiple server
CDN under any policy.
Lemma 8: For multiple server CDN, upper bound of
throughput is
J cub =
m∑
i=1
min (λci (0), µ
c
i)
where λci (0) is the maximum available arrival rate for surro-
gate server Si at empty state after distributing the arrival rates
in the common areas among the servers in such a way that∑m
i=1min (λ
c
i (0), µ
c
i ) is maximized.
Proof: Since any server can not serve at a rate higher
than its service rate, the upper bound of the throughput is
actually the minimum of the service rate and the arrival rate.
The area covered by a server is maximum when it is idle (i.e.,
no outstanding request). So, when the system is at empty state,
total arrival rate is maximum. Now distributing the arrivals
in the common area in such a way that maximizes the term∑m
i=1min (λ
c
i (0), µ
c
i ), where λci (0) is the total arrival rate
at server Si after distribution, ensures that each server has
maximum available arrival rate. Hence, the upper bound is
determined by summation of the minimum of this arrival rate
and the service rate of each server.
Following theorem shows that for very large system our
policy actually achieve this upper bound.
Theorem 4: If J cs is the actual throughput of policy πs and
J cub is the upper bound of the throughput under any policy,
then
lim
c→∞
1
c
J cs = lim
c→∞
1
c
J cub.
Proof: Since under policy πs, each user is mapped to
one and only surrogate server, the system will behave like
m independent single server CDNs. So we can carry out the
analysis for each server independently without taking into
account the state of other servers. Let J ci be the throughput
of server Si. Then we have,
J cs =
m∑
i=1
J ci .
In multiple server case, for any server Si, the arrival rate
may be less than the arrival rate in the total circular area
encompassed by its radius due to sharing of common areas
with other servers. Suppose, when the server Si is at empty
state the size of the area inside its circle that is given to other
servers is aci,0 and when the server is at state n the size of the
area inside its circle that is given to other servers is aci,n.
Fix some ǫ > 0 and let us consider a system where the
arrival rate in the whole network A is λcǫ = λc + ǫ and other
parameters µci ,A, ψ are same as those of the original system.
Due to uniform distribution of end users in the whole network,
at empty state arrival rate for any server would be λciǫ(0) =
λci (0)+ ǫi where ǫi ≤ ǫ. Clearly for every n, λciǫ(n) ≥ λci (n).
Since,
λci (n)
µci
λci (0)
µci
=
λci (n)
λci (0)
=
(ψ − n+1
cµ
)2 − aci,n
(ψ − 1
cµi
)2 − aci,0
,
we have,
λciǫ(n)
µci
≥
λci (n)
µci
=
(
(ψ − n+1
cµ
)2 − aci,n
(ψ − 1
cµ
)2 − aci,0
)
λc(0)
µc
Clearly aci,0 ≥ aci,n ≥ 0 and (ψ − 1cµi )
2 − (ψ −
n+1
cµi
)2 ≥
(aci,0−a
c
i,n)
π
. So when cµi ≫ n, (ψ − 1cµi )
2 ≈
(ψ − n+1
cµi
)2 and aci,0 ≈ aci,n. So, for any finite constant
C, limc→∞
(ψ−C+1
cµ
)2−aci,C
(ψ− 1
cµ
)2−aci,0
converges to 1. So, for any finite
constant C,
lim
c→∞
λciǫ(n)
µci
≥
λc(0)
µc
.
Now using exactly the same technique of Lemma 7, we
have,
lim
c→∞
1
c
J ci = lim
c→∞
1
c
min (λci (0), µi) .
Then,
lim
c→∞
1
c
J cs = lim
c→∞
1
c
m∑
i=1
J ci = lim
c→∞
1
c
m∑
i=1
min (λci (0), µi)
But, by Lemma 8, we have
J cub =
m∑
i=1
min (λci (0), µ
c
i )
So, we have,
lim
c→∞
1
c
J cs = lim
c→∞
1
c
J cub.
The result of above theorem shows that our static policy
πs has asymptotically optimal throughput and thus generate
maximum revenue for very large system.
D. Numerical Results
In this section, we present some numerical results from
MATLAB simulation that show that actual throughput con-
verges to the upper bound of the throughput when the system
is large. We check the throughput for all three possible cases
where arrival rate is greater than, equal to and less than the
service rate for a single server case.
Table III, Table IV and Table V show the cases where
the arrival rate at empty state is slightly greater than, equal
to and slightly less than the service rate, respectively. In all
cases, for sufficiently large value of the scaling factor c, the
throughput of the server converges to the upper bound of the
throughput. This result establishes our result that for a large
system, the throughput of a server equals the minimum of
arrival rate at empty state and service rate. Note that, when
the system is not at empty state, the arrival rate is actually
lower than the arrival rate of empty state. So, this result is
counterintuitive and this insight builds the foundation of our
TABLE III
SINGLE SERVER CDN WITH λ(0) > µ; ψ = 1000, λ(0) = 1.05, µ = 1.
Scaling factor,c Throughput Upper Bound ThroughputUpper bound
1 0.988756 1.000000 0.988756
2 1.991859 2.000000 0.995930
3 2.994649 3.000000 0.998216
4 3.996626 4.000000 0.999156
5 4.997924 5.000000 0.999585
6 5.998744 6.000000 0.999791
7 6.999250 7.000000 0.999893
8 7.999556 8.000000 0.999944
9 8.999739 9.000000 0.999971
10 9.999848 10.000000 0.999985
11 10.999911 11.000000 0.999992
12 11.999949 12.000000 0.999996
13 12.999970 13.000000 0.999998
14 13.999983 14.000000 0.999999
15 14.999990 15.000000 0.999999
16 15.999994 16.000000 1.000000
TABLE IV
SINGLE SERVER CDN WITH λ(0) = µ; ψ = 1000, λ(0) = 1 AND µ = 1.
Scaling factor,c Throughput Upper Bound ThroughputUpper bound
1 0.9653 1 0.964094
2 1.9506 2 0.974659
5 4.9213 5 0.983999
10 9.8882 10 0.988695
20 19.8415 20 0.992010
50 49.7487 50 0.994949
100 99.6442 100 0.996430
200 199.4964 200 0.997476
2000 1.9986e+03 2000 0.999311
20000 1.9995e+04 20000 0.999748
200000 1.9998e+05 200000 0.999920
2000000 1.9999e+06 2000000 0.999975
static request routing policy. Our routing policy chooses the
surrogate server for a request by solving the optimization
problem where the objective is to maximize the summation
of the minimum of arrival rate at empty state and service rate
for each of the servers of the CDN. As a result, our policy
achieves the upperbound of throughput for large system and
so, it is asymptotically optimal for multiple server CDN.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We look at the big picture of content delivery network.
Web based commercial CDNs compete with each other to
grab the market share. The goal of the CEO is to maximize
profit whereas the design engineer looks at the system per-
formance. We try to incorporate this two perspectives in one
single framework and figure out which design methodology
maximizes monetary benefit. In our analysis of competition,
we find that economy of scale effect is very significant here.
So peering agreement among smaller CDNs may be a good
idea to increase monetary benefits. Although we have analyzed
the competition of CDNs using a model for two and three
CDNs, same techniques can be used to analyze competition
among larger number of CDNs. However, with the increase
of the number of CDNs the analysis becomes more and more
tedious. Future works might include analyzing a more general
model having arbitrary number of competing CDNs.
TABLE V
SINGLE SERVER CDN WITH λ(0) < µ; ψ = 1000, λ(0) = 0.8 AND µ = 1.
Scaling factor,c Throughput Upper Bound ThroughputUpper bound
1 0.794054 0.800000 0.992567
100 79.993605 80.000000 0.999920
200 159.993603 160.000000 0.999960
300 239.993602 240.000000 0.999973
400 319.993601 320.000000 0.999980
500 399.993601 400.000000 0.999984
600 479.993601 480.000000 0.999987
700 559.993601 560.000000 0.999989
800 639.993601 640.000000 0.999990
900 719.993601 720.000000 0.999991
1000 799.993601 800.000000 0.999992
We also provide a static request routing policy which has
been shown as asymptotically optimal. Although our model is
developed in the context of a CDN, it is relevant to a variety of
contexts. For example, our approach can be used to determine
the routing policy for a website that maintains a number of
mirrors in various places of the network and try to serve as
many requests as possible within a fixed user latency.
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